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Even though understanding is a very widely used concept, both colloquially and in
scholarly work, its definition is nebulous and it is not well-studied as a psychological
construct, compared to other psychological constructs like learning and memory.
Studying understanding based on third-person (e.g., behavioral, neuroimaging) data
alone presents unique challenges. Understanding refers to a first-person experience
of making sense of an event or a conceptual domain, and therefore requires
incorporation of multiple levels of study, at the first-person (phenomenological),
behavioral, and neural levels. Previously, psychological understanding was defined
as a form of conscious knowing. Alternatively, biofunctional approach extends to
unconscious, implicit, automatic, and intuitive aspects of cognition. Here, to bridge
these two approaches an embodied and evolutionary perspective is provided to situate
biofunctional understanding in theories of embodiment, and to discuss how simulation
theories of cognition, which regard simulation of sensorimotor and affective states as a
central tenet of cognition, can bridge the gap between biofunctional and psychological
understanding.
Keywords: biofunctional understanding, psychological understanding, embodied cognition, simulation theories,
evolution of cognition
Understanding is a widely used but an ill-defined concept. Colloquially it refers to meta awareness
or conscious monitoring of a mental state that involves making sense of a situation or an event.
It also implies a parity between one’s own mental model (e.g., of a phenomenon), and another
person’s mental model (e.g., “I understand what you mean”) or an external entity that represents a
model (e.g., “I understand what the text says”). Educators often use the term understanding as part
of the goal statement of an instructional program or intervention to imply a deep form of learning,
where what is understood is internalized and becomes readily available for future interpretation of
events and decision making. In spite of the wide use of the term both in colloquial and academic
language, understanding is not subject to scientific study in cognitive sciences and education to the
extent that other mainstream constructs are, such as perception, learning, memory and executive
function. This essay focuses on one approach to understanding, the biofunctional one, and situates
biofunctional understanding in a wider embodied cognition framework, in an effort to reinterpret
understanding as a bodily state (as opposed to a mere mental state), and to situate understanding
as an evolutionary outcome; a response to the pressures of living in a time-pressured environment.
Biofunctionalism defines understanding as the special function of the distributed biological
activity in the various subsystems of the agent’s nervous system and the immediate source of an
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agent’s ongoing living experience (Iran-Nejad, 2013).
Understanding is not a conscious construction or acquisition of
mental structures that act as models of the outside world. Rather,
it is an adaptive change at the biological level as a result of situated
activity. It happens even when we are not consciously paying
attention to what we do. In this sense, it is like breathing (Iran-
Nejad, 2013). It can be controlled and structured with conscious
reflection, but it also lingers in an automatic, unconscious way.
In contrast with the cognitivist characterization of understanding
as acquiring permanent and abstract representations in the
long-term memory, biofunctionalism defines understanding
as a dynamic process where cognitive patterns elicited during
understanding are transient and dynamic.
In this paper a biofunctionalist account for understanding
is situated in empirical and theoretical embodied cognition
research. The overall purpose is to support the following four
arguments on understanding based on theories of embodiment
and empirical work on bodily foundations of cognition:
(1) Understanding is biological. It is an adaptive evolutionary
response to living in a time-pressured and dynamic
environment.
(2) Understanding is experiential. Understanding does not
follow acquisition of permanent and abstract mental
representations, it is a result of situated activity.
(3) Understanding involves acquisition reactivation of transient
sensorimotor and affective states.
(4) Biofunctional understanding is a prerequisite for
psychological understanding (Iran-Nejad, 2013). Simulated
multi-modal activity actualizes biofunctional understanding
which, in turn, underlies psychological understanding.
Psychological understanding makes use of perceptual
symbols systems (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) to consciously
access and structure biofunctional understanding.
These arguments are not separately considered here since they
are all interrelated. Instead, the discussion is structured around
theories of embodiment in the most salient domains of human
cognition for “understanding” (i.e., social cognition and verbal
skills, manual skills and tool use, and metaphorical thinking). The
reflection on these three domains unfold the necessary theoretical
implements to ground a biofunctional account for understanding
in embodied cognition.
UNDERSTANDING
Understanding is a nebulous concept. Philosophers have tackled
the issue of understanding and how it differs from knowing.
According to some, understanding constitutes a form of knowing
(Grimm, 2006), according to others (Meserve, 1981; Zagzebski,
2001; Kvanvig, 2003) understanding implies a tighter integration
between the content and the subject than knowing; “when we
say that we understand what others are doing or saying, we
are stating something quite different than that we know. To
understand is literally to stand under, to grasp, to hear, get,
catch, or comprehend the meaning of something. To know is
to signal that one has engaged in conscious deliberation and
can demonstrate, show, or clearly prove or support a claim”
(Schwandt, 1999, p. 452).
Understanding involves internalizing the content in a way
that it changes our perceptions and intuitions about what
is understood. For example, “when a mathematician says he
understands a mathematical theory, he possesses much more
knowledge than that which concerns the deductive aspects
of theorems and proofs[...] He has an intuitive feeling for
the subject, how it hangs together, and how it relates to
other theories. He knows how not to be swamped by details,
but also to reference them when he needs them” (Gregson,
2008, p. 361). This form of understanding cannot be fully
explained by computational cognitive models (Penrose, 1997).
From a phenomenological perspective, understanding changes
the phenomenal field (Merleau-Ponty, 1962); the field of our
experiences, how we see the things around us and how we situate
ourselves. This implies a deeper form of knowing; understanding
is not an isolated change in the mental representation (e.g.,
schema) for a given situation or knowledge domain; it represents
a new state of awareness, which changes the way we perceive and
respond to the world.
Approaching understanding not simply as a cerebral notion,
a phenomenon that refers to a new cognitive state, but as a new
bodily state that essentially changes how we respond to events in
an environment requires explicating how understanding relates
to action. If understanding is not merely a mental state and
actually refers to acquisition of new bodily states and patterns
of behavior, then how does the body support understanding?
Here I respond to this question by bridging biofunctional
understanding, which involve biological mechanisms that allow
development of dynamic internal states to accommodate
environmental changes and to allow the organism to maintain
self-integrity, with psychological understanding, which is an ill-
defined concept that roughly refers to having acquired knowledge
structures in an abstract domain.
DIFFERENT FORMS OF EMBODIMENT
Embodied cognition is not a single theory, but rather a
transdisciplinary research program representing a multitude of
theories on how cognition is grounded in bodily systems and
body’s interaction with the environment. Kiverstein and Clark’s
(2009) distinguishes between embodied approaches that regard
embodiment either as a component of cognition, or as a central
tenet. The perspective presented in this paper falls into the latter
category. The issue of representation is critical to distinguishing
between embodied approaches. Classical cognitivist theories
(e.g., Fodor, 1983) rely on mental-representations that are
symbolic, amodal, and body-independent structures in their
explanations of cognition. Efforts to situate cognition in bodily
activity yielded to two solutions with dealing with the problem
of amodal representations; striving to provide representation-
free accounts of cognition (e.g., Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2011),
or defining representations as mental structures with modal
content (i.e., simulations of bodily states; Barsalou, 1999, 2008).
Representation-free, radical, accounts of embodied cognition
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face the challenge of explaining off-line and abstract aspects of
cognition (i.e., representation hungry problems; see Clark, 1999).
Theoretical accounts that refer to representational content as
simulation of bodily states partially deal with this problem by
acknowledging the need for mental structures to explain off-
line and abstract cognition, and by grounding these mental
representations in simulations of bodily states (Barsalou, 2008).
The two seminal works, typically cited to mark the start
of the embodied cognition research program, “Metaphors We
Live By” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and “Autopoiesis and
Cognition” (Maturana and Varela, 1980) differ both in terms
of their focus, as well as the disciplines in which they are
grounded. Lakoff and Johnson’s work on conceptual metaphors
is rooted in a cognitive-linguistic tradition, while Maturana
and Varela’s work is essentially a biological theory of cognition.
The beginning of embodied cognition as a cross-disciplinary
research program that encompasses not only multiple fields
but also varied research methodologies yielded to distinct
development of embodied theories across multiple disciplines.
Today, research about how cognition is grounded in bodily
processes is conducted in various fields, including evolutionary
biology, cognitive neuroscience, traditional fields of psychology,
robotics and artificial intelligence, and education to name a
few. This expansiveness further yields to a vast and rich array
of research methods (e.g., behavioral experiments, qualitative
studies; neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies, cognitive
modeling, linguistic analysis, phenomenological studies). This
phenomenon is unique compared to previous paradigms of
cognition. For example, behaviorism was characterized by
conditioning experiments, and interventions developed based
on these experiments in practice fields. Furthermore, people
who did the original research and devised interventions based
on the original research considerably overlapped, particularly
early on, for behaviorism (e.g., Skinner’s work on programmed
instruction and Watson’s work on advertising). Another marked
difference, compared to behaviorism and cognitivisim is, how
rapidly research on embodied cognition was interpreted by
and influenced social sciences and the arts. Part of the reason
why embodiment was appealing to social scientists was because
the idea of the embodied mind, in particular its implications
for a theory of mind and consciousness, were to some extent
compatible with phenomenological approaches (Dreyfus, 1996).
While what I call different forms of embodied cognition
originate from different traditions and make diverging claims
about nature of cognition, they share some fundamental
assumptions about bodily foundations of human cognition
(Wilson, 2002; Ziemke, 2003). In addition, there is considerable
new interdisciplinary work merging embodied theories from
different orientations to provide a more unified theory of the
embodied mind that encompasses different levels of explanation,
such as linguistic, behavioral, neural, phenomenological (for
example see Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).
Simulation Theories of Cognition
Embodied approaches differ in their core claims about the
role of the sensorimotor systems in cognition and their
reliance on, disembodied, internal representation or cognitive
structures. One, perhaps oversimplified, way to distinguish
different embodied approaches would be to put them on
a scale of how much they rely on internal representations,
which are internal models of the external world. Even though
all embodied approaches share a general notion of cognition
being grounded in bodily systems, and in-context, situated
activity, off-line and abstract cognition constitutes a challenge
to embodied approaches. For example, while we can explain
semantic content of conceptual metaphors in language based on
bodily experiences, mathematical thinking, especially high-level
mathematics, is hard to explain as a function of bodily activity
alone (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000). Mental representations come to
our help in domains where we cannot provide a fully embodied
explanation.
One key notion of embodiment is the sharing of neural
resources between cognitive and sensorimotor processes.
According to simulation theories, cognitive processes are
embodied simulations; in the sense that they make use of
simulations of sensorimotor processes. Here, I use the term
simulation theories of cognition to refer to theories positing
that all cognitive processes are simulations of sensorimotor
processes. Simulation theories (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese and
Lakoff, 2005; Svensson et al., 2007, 2009) posit a decoupling
of sensorimotor functions from their original physical inputs
and outputs, in a way that these functions are redeployed
during the evolutionary process to serve conceptual processing
(Anderson, 2007). Embodied simulations are the source of
both structural and semantic content in conceptual knowledge.
Embodied simulations take place in multimodal sensorimotor
networks. Unlike the conventional idea of distinct sensory
and motor areas communicating through association areas,
multimodality refers to the integration of sensory modalities
with one another and also with motor modalities (Gallese
and Lakoff, 2005). Simulation theories also provide an
alternative to cognitivist notions of symbol processing (i.e.,
symbol crunching) by arguing that symbolic processing can
be grounded in sensorimotor systems. For example, Barsalou
(1999) argues that during perceptual experience association
areas in the brain capture bottom-up sensorimotor patterns.
Later, during the use of perceptual symbols association areas
activate some of the same sensorimotor areas in a top−down
manner. From this perspective the meaning of symbols
(semantics) emerge from the sensorimotor simulation of
relevant systems. Through experience, memories of the same
components are stored in a schematic manner. The memories
implement simulators of the perceptual experiences they
represent. Simulators can be perceptual, proprioceptive (coding
the position and movement of the body), or introspective.
Abstract concepts are grounded in the combinatorial and
recursive integration of simulators. Barsalou’s perceptual
symbol systems theory (Barsalou, 1999) does not completely
negate cognitive representations, but instead provides a
framework for how representations (e.g., abstract symbols)
can be grounded in the sensorimotor system. Not completely
negating cognitive representations and symbol processing allow
a higher explanatory power for grounding conceptual processing
in sensorimotor systems.
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In an effort to situate understanding within the framework
of embodiment presented, I argue that understanding could be
thought as development of bodily (sensorimotor and affective)
simulations that enable the modeling of the phenomenon
understood. Modeling here refers to development of a set of
simulations that provides an immediate sense of the inferential
structures and casual relations among the elements of the
domain studied. For example, understanding arithmetic or
algebra involves developing a sense for the affordances of the
symbols and notations used. What makes an expert in this
domain is how automatically one can make use of the perceptual
representations of the mathematical symbols presented in a
problem. Goldstone et al. (2010) show that across different
domains of science and mathematics (including arithmetic and
algebra) people rely on automatized perceptual simulations to
perform high-level tasks. Reliance and further specialization
of perceptual systems increase with expertise (i.e., experts
rely more on these automatic perceptual mechanisms). The
automatic mechanisms that develop with expertise allow the
learner to provide automatic and quick task-related responses.
From this perspective, understanding is about having developed
the perceptual and motor mechanisms that intuitively and
automatically interact with the different elements of the domain
understood.
Affordance (Gibson, 1986) is a key concept that can bridge
bodily mechanisms that help the organism to habituate in an
environment, develop intuitions, make automatic predictions
about future events, and seamlessly simulate opportunities for
interaction based on previous interactions, and understanding
as a psychological construct, which refers to having command
of an abstract domain, having insights about how the different
conceptual elements interact, and seamlessly perceive the
inferential relations among them. In his original description
Gibson (1986, p. 127) described affordances of an environment as
“what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for
good or ill”. He also pointed out that affordances of an object are
relative to an animal. The affordances change depending on the
anatomy, posture, behavior, and intentions or goals of the animal.
In this sense, affordance is not like inherent physical qualities,
but instead an emergent theme in the interaction between the
organism and the environment. Within this analogy (between
physical contexts and conceptual domains), conceptual domains
are like physical environments we live in. Concepts are like
objects. They afford certain interactions and transformations.
The affordances of concepts are relative to mental, emotional and
intentional states of the cognizer. Understanding is developing a
sense of affordances of the conceptual landscape; automatically
activating these affordances, predicting events, and having an
intuitive understanding of the inferential relations among the
different elements of the landscape.
Proposing that understanding has its origins in the organism’s
efforts to habituate to a physical context, and handle the pressures
imposed by the environment, calls for an evolutionary account of
how different bodily skills, originally evolved to respond to such
environmental pressures, were eventually repurposed to serve
abstract thinking and understanding in conceptual domains.
Below such an account is provided across three domains of
human cognition; social cognition, tool use, and metaphorical
thinking.
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL COGNITION
AND VERBAL SKILLS
Action understanding is the ability to make sense of
another individual’s actions by observing these actions. Early
neuroscience research showed that primates have specialized
systems for action understanding. This system enables the
observer to mentally simulate the observed goal-directed action
in an effort to make sense of the intended goal of the action,
and predict the possible outcomes (di Pellegrino et al., 1992;
Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Action understanding is a prerequisite
for coordinated and collaborative goal-oriented group behavior.
Action understanding is also a prerequisite for theory of mind
skills; understanding mental states of other individuals based on
their observed behaviors.
Theories of how we understand mental states of other
individuals (“mind reading”) can roughly be categorized into
two: According to the theory−theory (TT), mind-reading is
possible by theorizing about the inner states (e.g., desires, beliefs)
of another individual and predicting the observable behaviors
based on the assumptions about these inner states (Carruthers,
1996). TT approaches social interaction as a disembodied,
cognitive phenomenon. A second approach, simulation theory
(ST), asserts that humans understand other people’s mental states
by imaginatively constructing and adopting their perspective.
According to ST mind-reading involves simulation of the
perceived conditions of another individual, and matching the
inner state of the observed individual with the resonant states of
the self, i.e., states that one can understand as “perspectives I have
taken” (see Gallese and Goldman, 1998 for a comparison of these
two approaches).
Findings about cortical mechanisms in the monkey brain that
activate perceptuomotor systems associated with the observed
action during observation of goal-directed actions suggest that
social skills, like imitation and mind-reading, involve simulation
systems (Hauser and Wood, 2010). Studies on humans show
evidence for a similar “mirroring” simulation mechanism in the
human brain (Grezes et al., 2003; Mukamel et al., 2010), namely
the Mirror Neuron System (MNS).
Identification of the MNS and theories of social cognition
incorporating the MNS lead to embodied and evolutionary
accounts for human communicative behavior (Rizzolatti and
Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2002; Gentilucci and Corballis, 2006;
Fogassi and Ferrari, 2007). These accounts connect humans’
unmatched verbal skills to more ancient skills such as grasping,
action understanding and imitation, to provide an integrative
evolutionary explanation for language development from early
primates to humans. For example, Arbib (2002, 2005, 2011)
proposed that a MNS for motor behavior, especially for hand
movements and facial gestures, is the antecedent of verbal
communicative behavior in humans. The proposed evolutionary
trajectory involves, first the development of a mirror system
that matches observation and execution of hand movements for
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action understanding, then emergence of the ability for imitation,
followed by a manual (or gesture) based communication system,
and the development of the vocal system, ultimately leading to
complex human languages.
MANUAL SKILLS, TOOL USE, AND
SOCIAL LEARNING
Tool use can generally be described as the use of an external
physical entity to improve human manipulative capabilities. The
adaptive advantage of tool use is proposed as one of the most
important driving factors of hominid evolution (van Schaik et al.,
1999) and learning how to use tools through imitation and
social interaction co-evolved with human communicative skills
(most notably verbal and theory of mind skills; Arbib, 2011).
Two distinct systems are at play in regards to humans’ use and
conceptual/social processing of tools.
The first system enables semantic access to the affordances of
a tool merely based on sensory stimuli (i.e., without using the
tool; e.g., seeing the tool). The affordance calculation system is
thought to involve a special set of neurons, namely canonical
neurons, distributed in parietal and premotor areas. In early
primate studies canonical neurons were shown to charge when
the monkey observes and executes grasping movements, as well
as when the monkey passively observes an object that affords a
grasping movement (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998). Homologue
canonical systems in a network of left premotor and parietal areas
were found in humans when subjects were shown pictures of
tools but not when they were shown pictures of animals, faces
or houses (Chao and Martin, 2000; Grezes et al., 2003), which
supports the idea that canonical neurons differentially respond to
manipulable objects. Furthermore, Grezes et al. (2003) point out
that the ventral precentral sulcus activation during observation
of manipulable objects overlap with previous imaging studies
involving perception of gestures, execution of hand movements
or mental imagery of hand movements (e.g., Grafton et al., 1996,
1997; Chao and Martin, 2000), which suggests that identification
of a tool involves activating motor circuits that are originally used
during interaction with that tool.
The second system is involved in the use of a tool. Clinical
case studies suggest that the two systems, for identification
and use, might be dissociable (one can have disruptions in
one system without affecting the other one; see Johnson-Frey,
2004 for a review). This dissociation might have allowed further
specialization of the semantic system, independent of the motor
component.
METAPHORICAL THINKING: MAPPING A
BODILY DOMAIN WITH A CONCEPTUAL
DOMAIN
Study of conceptual metaphors started with analysis of verbal
and written language to explore how humans’ conceptual worlds
are largely metaphorical. Here a metaphor is defined as a
mapping from a familiar and casual source domain to a novel
and possibly more abstract target domain (e.g., “I wasted a
lot of time”–time as a limited resource–). Because our day-
to-day experiences, intuitions, and knowledge mostly involves
bodily states, corporeal experiences often constitute the source
domain (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Johnson, 1987). In addition
to mapping of a source domain with a target domain, study of
metaphors involves image schemas, conceptual primitives about
spatial relations (Johnson, 1987), aspect schemas, structures
coding events with temporal dimension, and conceptual blends,
structuring of a new domain by way of blending multiple
domains (Tunner and Fauconnier, 1995).
Even though studies on use of metaphors in language
provide some evidence for involvement of bodily systems
in cognition, early work in this domain (e.g., Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Tunner and Fauconnier, 1995; Fauconnier and
Turner, 1998) did not focus on the biological (e.g., neural,
proprioceptive, psycholinguistic) mechanisms that played a role
in metaphor processing. Ideas of embodiment emerged in
the early 1980s concurrently across multiple disciplines (e.g.,
Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Maturana and Varela, 1980; Moravec,
1988; Brooks, 1989), though unified, cross-disciplinary theories
of embodiment that bridged these disciplines (e.g., cognitive
linguistics and neuroscience) emerged much later (e.g., Gallese
and Lakoff, 2005). According to one such theory metaphorical
thinking occurs by mental simulation of the actions defined in
a metaphor (Gibbs, 2006). A mental simulation of this form
would warrant activation of semantically relevant sensorimotor
systems both during non-metaphorical (e.g., “grasp the apple”),
as well as metaphorical (e.g., “grasp the concept”) language
comprehension. A multitude of studies provide evidence for use
of sensorimotor systems (which are also active during execution
and observation of actions) during language processing. For
example, it was shown that action-related sentences modulate
relevant parts of the motor system (i.e., hands and feet; Buccino
et al., 2005), handedness modulates hemispherical lateralization
of premotor cortex activation during action verb understanding
of manual but not non-manual action verbs (Willems et al.,
2010), and listening to action verbs that involve the mouth,
hand, or leg engages matching visuomotor circuits (Tettamanti
et al., 2005). A ST is proposed to explain these phenomena: “The
understanding of action-related sentences implies an internal
simulation of the actions expressed in the sentences, mediated by
the activation of the same motor representation that is involved
in their execution” (Buccino et al., 2005, p. 361).
In parallel to the findings on literal processing of action
verbs, Gibbs et al. (2006) reported that observing, imagining,
and executing actions described in a metaphor facilitated
comprehension of the metaphorical meaning. They explain
these findings by arguing that (a) “People’s understanding of
metaphorical language involves their engaging in embodied
simulations that in the case of expressions like ‘stretch for
understanding’ and ‘chew on the idea’ make these phrases both
understandable and conceptually plausible” (p. 222), and (b)
“Having people watch, imitate, or imagine engaging in relevant
embodied actions (e.g., chewing or grasping) may enhance the
degree to which they conceptualize metaphorical actions through
embodied simulations” (p. 224). However, in an fMRI study
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Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006) reported no neural congruence between
observation of hand, foot, and mouth movements and processing
of metaphorical sentences involving matching actions. Aziz-
Zadeh and Damasio (2008) explained this based on a difference
in processing novel and familiar metaphors. In novel metaphors
the salient feature might be the non-metaphorical meaning of the
action verb, where the metaphorical meaning is more salient in
familiar metaphors, reducing reliance on motor processing.
UNDERSTANDING IN THE WILD:
BRIDGING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
BIOFUNCTIONAL
So far I focused on a strand of embodied cognition that
explains different forms of thinking based on simulation of
sensorimotor and affective states, and reflected on this approach
across three domains of cognition (i.e., social cognition and
verbal abilities, manual skills and tool use, and metaphorical
thinking). Going back to the discussion on understanding, how
does understanding take place across these three domains?
Understanding is social. We often characterize our ability
to make sense of others’ behaviors as “understanding”.
Understanding also relates to our ability to act on the world
by making, learning how to use, or using tools. And finally
understanding is also used to describe the extent to which a
conceptual domain (e.g., mathematics) makes sense to us, based
on a metaphorical match between a new domain and one that
is familiar to us. Across these three domains we “understand”
through situated activity; our experiences changing both our
body (e.g., muscles, structural and functional patterns in the
brain) as well as our first-person experience (e.g., our awareness,
the way we perceive the world).
Iran-Nejad (2013) proposes two levels of understanding;
psychological and biofunctional. Psychological understanding
refers to things that the understander deliberately makes sense
of based on what is already consciously known, which is
spontaneously provided by the biofunctional understanding.
Biofunctional understanding is tacit, intuitive, and unconscious.
Here I propose (1) that the biofunctional understanding is
an evolutionary outcome due to selective pressures of a time-
pressured environment, (2) that psychological understanding is
largely based on our ability to form perceptual symbol systems
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008), and (3) biofunctional understanding
is a prerequisite for psychological understanding in that
psychological understanding happens by perceptual symbolic
structuring of biofunctional understanding.
Cognition has evolved in a time-pressured environment,
which selected for mechanisms that can support production of
rapid and spontaneous behaviors as responses to environmental
events (Clark, 1997). There are two mechanisms that support
production of such spontaneous and rapid responses; (1)
Prediction and anticipation mechanisms: if the agent can
simulate what might take place next based on the current events,
the system can also prepare itself to produce responses before
the triggering events take place (Bar, 2007; Svensson et al.,
2009). (2) By automatizing the responses: through protracted
interaction with the environment we develop ways of interaction
that becomes automatic overtime. Automaticity takes place in
direct, bodily (e.g., finger movements; Wu et al., 2004), as well
as social and cognitive processing (Bargh et al., 2012).
Our perception and experience of the current moment
inherently involves events that are likely to happen in the very
near future. Every decision and action is based on an anticipation
for what might come next given our previous experiences, current
actions, and the perceptual cues in the environment. In the
social context, the history of interactions, cultural norms and the
observed individuals provide cues for possibilities of impending
social events. We interact with non-living objects in similar ways.
Affordance (Gibson, 1979) is described as the possibilities of
interaction with an object based on our history of interactions.
The affordance calculation system is automatic and is central to
our interaction with the objects in the environment (Ellis and
Tucker, 2000; Borghi, 2004; Pezzulo et al., 2010). Affordance
is similar to the anticipatory or predictive systems used in
social interaction. It allows for activation of necessary resources
before they are needed, and therefore improves production of
appropriate responses. At the phenomenological level this is
experienced as a sense of what might come next and limits the
possibilities of future goal-directed actions.
Understanding as a concept is a social construct that refers
to a self-monitored mental state. However, a scientific study of
understanding needs to ground understanding at multiple levels
of analysis, such as cognitive, neural, and evolutionary. From
an evolutionary perspective understanding can be grounded
as a response to the pressures of living in a time-pressured
environment. From this perspective what is understood becomes
part of the phenomenal field and changes the responses to
the environmental events. For example, understanding how
to use a tool can allow spontaneous generation of responses
using the tool. Similarly, understanding fractions in mathematics
can allow automatic consideration of fraction relations in
understanding a quantitative phenomenon. Regardless of the
domain, understanding implies a change in the way we see the
world, which results with changes how we respond to the events
in the world we live in.
Even though understanding assumes meta-awareness and
self-monitoring of mental states, which is arguably unique to
humans, an evolutionary approach would require tracing the
antecedents of understanding. Previous work on biology of
cognition provides some operational constructs that can help
building an evolutionary theory of where understanding comes
from.
Autopoiesis and Biofunctional
Understanding
In “Autopoiesis and Cognition” Maturana and Varela (1980)
present a theory of how physiological functioning grounds
cognition. Based on his earlier studies on the vision of frogs
and pigeons, Maturana proposes that considering vision, and
perception in general, as the mapping of an objective, external
world, was an inadequate approach. This representationalist
approach could not explain a multitude of cases where the
sensory experience interacts with certain features of the perceived
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(e.g., geometrical features interacting with color distinctions), or
with the situated activity of the observer, particularly in time-
pressured activity. Maturana developed a new approach, in which
the activity of the nervous system is considered to be determined
only by the nervous system itself. The external stimuli only
have the role of triggering an internally determined activity
of the nervous system. This approach has a lager implication;
perception is not viewed as receiving input from an external
reality but the activity of constructing a reality. Maturana and
Varela (1980) characterized living things as self-referential, self-
constructing and autonomous units. They described a cognitive
system as a system that defines a domain of interactions for
maintaining itself, and the cognitive activity as acting in this
domain.
Autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980; Maturana, 2002) is a
concept that was initially proposed to explain processes that help
biological cells maintain self-integrity. It defines an operationally
closed system; with internal processes that are dynamic and
ever changing to accommodate the changes in the environment
and the demands of survival. Autopoiesis represents a form
of sensory-motor coupling. Unlike the information processing
approach where sensory inputs are internally processed to
produce motor outputs, sensory-motor coupling represents
integration of perception and action. Perception is guided
or modulated by motor experience and the motor behavior
overlaps with perceptual experience. For example, perception
and categorization of objects in the environment involves motor
simulation of interaction with these objects (Ellis and Tucker,
2000). In this sense, the previous motor experiences change the
way the objects in the environment are perceived. From this
perspective cognition is defined as “. . . the capacity that a living
system exhibits of operating in dynamic structural congruence
with the medium in which it exists” (Maturana, 2002, p. 26).
Autopoiesis is a useful construct in explaining how the
cognizing agent changes its internal structure to accommodate
the demands of the environment in which it is situated. It
also describes an unconscious set of processes and states that
overlap with the biofunctional understanding put forth by
Iran-Nejad (2013), “Biofunctional is the kind of understanding
that is caught spontaneously, rather than caused deliberately,
by the understander [. . .] It is regulated effortlessly by
some evolution-sculpted combination of multiple internal and
external sources working together simultaneously [. . .]The
good news is that biofunctional understanding continues,
even in the absence of psychological understanding just as
breathing occurs in the absence of taking deep breaths or
smoking and healing occurs even in the absence of nursing”
(pp. 4−6). Biofunctional understanding, then, can be considered
as an autopoietic phenomenon, which sets the foundation for
psychological understanding. For example, as discussed before,
basic competencies, like action understanding and affordance
calculation, which originally evolved to support an accord
between one’s own internal states and the environment later
(adaptive coupling) were repurposed for more abstract forms
of, oﬄine, thinking. Predicting future events in an environment
and planning actions to prepare for these predicted events
can be considered autopoietic functions in a more broadly
defined way. The point made here is that there is no
discrete difference between biofunctional understanding and
psychological understanding; we can see the relation between
these two as part of a spectrum, with unconscious, low-level
biological processes serving autopoietic functions on one end,
and oﬄine cognition systems that use embodied simulations to
predict and plan for future events, and involve what we refer to as
abstract thinking on the other.
Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) and
Psychological Understanding
As mentioned earlier, embodied theories that target a
representation-free account of cognition are challenged with
aspects of oﬄine cognitive processing (for example mathematics).
Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2008)
meets the representation problem by bridging classical theories
of cognition (e.g., symbolic computation) with embodied
(grounded) accounts (e.g., embodied simulations). PSS argues
for a single, multi-modal simulation system tightly coupled with
the linguistic system. According to PSS cognitive processes,
implicit memory, working-memory, long-term memory and
conceptual knowledge, differ in terms of the mechanisms used to
capture multimodal states that are simulated during processing.
From the PSS perspective implicit memory matches with what
is described in biofunctional understanding. Implicit memory
is automatic, unconscious, pre-linguistic and produces effects
like pattern completion and priming (Barsalou et al., 2003).
Working memory uses a similar simulation system but maintains
an active modal representation in frontal areas of the brain,
only temporarily. Long-term memory keeps episodic events
in the form of modal simulations in the frontal and medial
temporal systems. Conceptual knowledge is comprehensive and
uses a distributed network of frontal, parietal and temporal
systems. Barsalou (2005) also proposes that nonhuman
animals have a comparable multi-modal simulation system.
Differentially though, humans’ conceptual capabilities arise from
the interaction between language and simulation systems. PSS
is unique among simulation theories of cognition in that it does
not refuse cognitive symbol systems per se, but rather grounds
them in modal (sensorimotor/affective simulation) systems.
Perceptual Symbol Systems bridges the biofunctional
with psychological understanding, and pre-theoretical with
theoretical cognizing. Based on a mixed PSS and biofunctional
interpretation, while the biofunctional understanding leads to
an intuitive, unconscious and pre-linguistic sense of the world,
psychological understanding makes biofunctional understanding
accessible and structured through use of perceptual symbols.
CONCLUSION
Understanding is a widely used but a nebulous concept that
does not have a clear operational definition both in its
colloquial and scholarly use. This is unlike other constructs
in psychology. For example, working memory has been widely
studied experimentally, there are some multitude theories of how
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it works at different levels (e.g., behavioral, cognitive, neural), and
there are well established notions about its different components
(e.g., phonological loop). This is not the case for understanding;
not because understanding refers to a psychological state
humans experience less often than working memory, but more
because of the difficulty of operationalizing understanding from
a third-person observer’s perspective. Working memory can
easily be tested using a simple task (e.g., digit-span task),
there are a multitude of cognitive models that explain its
function (see Baddeley, 2012), and its neural correlates have been
well studied using relatively simple paradigms. Understanding
is not nearly as well defined as working memory, there
are no established paradigms to measure it, and it is hard
to provide theoretical models for it without philosophizing
about the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995).
One important feature of understanding that distinguishes it
from other widely studied psychological constructs is that it
is impossible to define it without referring to, first-person,
phenomenology of the experience of understanding. It is difficult
to distinguish understanding from not understanding (or lack of
understanding) from a third-person perspective (i.e., based on
behavioral data), without reducing understanding to a form of
memory acquisition or retrieval.
The first-person experience of understanding refers to a
state of harmony between the internal emotional and mental
states, and the perceived, external states of the world. Here I
argue that one key to understanding understanding is to trace
back the biological mechanisms for adaptive coupling; systems
evolved to maintain self-integrity in the face of environmental
changes. Then our task is to consider evolution of cognition
as part of an ongoing evolutionary trend to develop adaptive
systems that can help maintain self-integrity of an organism.
For humans this processes led to unmatched skills for social
communication and coordination, building and using tools, and
constructing conceptual worlds based on metaphorical relations
with bodily experiences. Based on theories of embodied cognition
that consider simulation of sensorimotor and affective states a
central tenet, I propose that understanding is a match between
the predicted states by way of embodied simulations and the
external states presented by the environment. Based on the
metaphor of a cognitive domain as a landscape of concepts,
understanding is characterized as developing an intuitive sense
of the affordances of elements in a conceptual landscape and their
casual interactions.
From the evolutionary perspective presented, psychological
understanding is an extension of biofunctional understanding.
Understanding in a conceptual domain relies on overlapping
mechanisms as biofunctional understanding. Previous research
about the centrality of metaphorical thinking in human cognition
provides an account of how bodily experiences enable conceptual
thinking based on metaphorical relations between the bodily
source domain and the target conceptual domain (Gibbs et al.,
2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). Similarly, mechanisms of
understanding in bodily domains are not markedly different than
understanding in conceptual domains.
As previously mentioned understanding is difficult to study
without considering the first-person experience of understanding
(Iran-Nejad et al., 2015). Future research should focus on
characterizing the first-person experience of understanding
across neural, cognitive, and behavioral levels. Research on
insight, a concept closely related to understanding; but one
characterizes a more instantaneous experience, exemplifies
this approach and can constitute a model for research on
understanding (Kounios and Beeman, 2014).
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